An automotive operating system is a safety-critical system that has a critical impact on the safety of road vehicles. Safety verification is a must in each stage of software development in such a system, but most existing work focuses on specification-level or model-level safety verification. This work proposes a collaborative approach using model checking and testing for the efficient safety checking of an automotive operating system. Efficiency is achieved through property-based slicing, which reduces the complexity of verification, and guided test sequence generation, which limits the input space to a set of representative test sequences selected from legal as well as illegal input spaces. Comprehensiveness is achieved by formally specifying external constraints using constraint automata from which guided test sequences are selected. The approach is implemented as a prototype tool set applied to the verification of an open source automotive operating system based on the OSEK/VDX international standard. The approach revealed several safety issues that could not be identified by existing approaches.
Introduction
As most safety-critical systems are increasingly controlled by software, software safety is becoming a prerequisite for system safety that must be thoroughly checked. A representative example can be found in the automotive industry, where road vehicles are equipped with an increasing number of electrical devices called ECUs (Electrical Control Units), which are controlled by the operating system. The operating system is the core of the control software and any malfunction on its part can cause critical errors in the automotive system, which in turn may result in loss of lives and assets.
The difficulty in software safety checking lies in its high complexity. No matter whether it is for functional safety or code safety, safety checking for software requires comprehensive behavioral analysis, which often ranges over hundreds of millions of different cases. The complexity remains the same regardless of the choice of verification technique: either manual analysis, automated verification using dynamic testing, or static model checking. Testing has been widely used as a systematic and cost-effective safety analysis/assurance method [2, 3] , but its optimistic incompleteness often misses critical problems and cannot guarantee the "absence of wrong behavior" unless testing can be exhaustively performed on every possible execution path of the software, which is costly, if not impossible. Model checking [4, 5] is an alternative complementary verification technique that, in a sense, automatically performs exhaustive testing. It is suitable for comprehensive functional safety analysis and can effectively identify subtle issues, such as process deadlock, illegal functional behavior, and starvation. However, its exhaustiveness naturally requires more resources and can often be too costly to be practical. Reducing verification cost in practice requires expertise in formal methods as well as domain knowledge.
A practical solution to this problem has been actively sought with various abstraction and engineering techniques [6, 7, 8, 9] . Nevertheless, efficient approaches for safety checking embedded software are relatively rare, especially for automotive operating systems. This may be partly due to the fact that the operational environment plays a crucial role in the verification of operating systems, but it is not trivial to comprehend the environment.
Based upon our experiences with safety analysis for automotive operating systems [10] , we expect that successful safety checking for automotive software requires solutions to the following issues:
1. The size of the model/code to be verified needs to be minimized to avoid state-space explosion. 2. Efficient modeling of the environment, such as user tasks and hardware environment, is necessary and critical.
Since an operating system is a reactive system responding to environmental stimuli, the correctness of its behavior needs to be analyzed with respect to the behavior of its environments. A selected representative environment is often used in testing in the form of test drivers, but its comprehensiveness is hard to justify. A non-deterministic environment is typically used to over-approximate actual behavior in model checking, but it is often too expensive for exhaustive verification. The difficulty and importance of defining a good environment model has been addressed in a number of previous works [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16] .
We note that these two problems apply to both model checking and testing. Though the level of comprehensiveness differs, both techniques rely on automated search techniques initiated by environmental stimuli. This is called environment model in model checking and test scenario in testing. This work proposes a solution to these two problems using property-based code slicing, to reduce the size of the code to be verified and to generate an efficient and effective environment model. The goal is to minimize the kernel code to the set of functions relevant for a given property and to construct a comprehensive usage model for functional safety checking. The sliced code together with its environment model is verified using both testing and model checking to compare their impact on verification efficiency. Our code slicing is an extension of existing techniques [17, 18] with more emphasis on function slicing where inter-procedural call relations and the use of global variables need to be considered.
Function slicing extracts a set of compilable functions that have direct/indirect dependencies on a given property to be verified, by (1) identifying variables involved in the property (target variables, initial slicing criteria), (2) identifying all the statements and relevant variables that directly/indirectly modify the target variables (extended slicing criteria), (3) identifying functions that modify global variables that are directly/indirectly relevant for the target variables, and (4) constructing a minimal compilable code fragment including all the statements directly/indirectly relevant for the extended slicing criteria. A list of system-level functions identified during the slicing process is used to construct a valid and comprehensive environment model for an operating system in the form of constraint automata. A constraint automaton is a formal specification of an external constraint specified in the OSEK/VDX [19] standard for automotive operating systems. The formal specification allows us to perform a guided search through valid/invalid input spaces and to construct an environment that subsumes representative input sequences of the entire input space. The environment model is then used to comprehensively generate system-level test sequences. The same set of constraint automata is used to generate module-level test sequences through the mapping between system-level API functions and module-level function sequences. Comprehensive verification of the extracted set of functions can be performed using both testing and model checking.
Software slicing [18] is widely known and used in various program analysis techniques [20, 21, 17, 22, 23] . The novelty of our approach lies in the use of the slicing result for environment modeling. Formal constraint specification and generation of test sequences for automotive operating systems are also new. Several improvements have been made compared to the earlier version of this paper presented at FTSCS 2012 [1], including the following major changes:
3. Verification efficiency has been improved by guided test sequence generation. 4. Module-level internal constraints are systematically identified.
The approach and the tool are applied to the verification of assertions of the Trampoline operating system [24] , which is an open source automotive operating system compliant with OSEK/VDX. The model checker CBMC [25] and system-level/module-level guided testing were used to compare their fault-detection capability, their comprehensiveness in terms of code coverage, and their efficiency in terms of resource consumption.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the motivation for our work, followed by an overview of our approach in Section 3. Section 4 introduces our property-based function slicing technique and Section 5 presents methods for constructing environment models and for automated test generation. Section 6 explains the implementation details. Section 7 presents the experimental results and the evaluation using the Trampoline OS as a case example. We conclude in Section 9, after a discussion on related work in Section 8.
Background

OSEK/VDX
OSEK/VDX is a joint project of the automotive industry that aims at establishing an industry standard for an open-ended architecture for distributed control units in vehicles [19] . The aim of OSEK/VDX is to provide standard interfaces independent of application, hardware, and network, and ultimately, to save the development costs for non-application related aspects of control software. It is specialized for automotive control systems, removing all undesired complexities such as dynamic memory allocation, circular waiting for resources, multithreading, and so on. Since its target system is safety-critical, it strictly prohibits uncontrolled dynamic behavior of the system. OSEK/VDX has been installed on millions of ECUs worldwide, and has been adopted by AUTOSAR [26] as the basis of its operating system.
Conformance testing is a standard verification method for the certification of OSEK/VDX-based operating systems. However, testing is insufficient for identifying safety problems by its nature. As OSEK OS specification explicitly specifies 26 basic APIs, a thorough system-level functional testing would require at least 26 × 2 × 3 test cases even if we assume two arguments per API and only boundary values for the arguments are chosen. This number increases exponentially with the length of the test sequences.
ISO 26262
ISO 26262 [27] is an international functional safety standard for the development of automotive systems. It requires the application of safety assurance techniques throughout the development life cycle, suggesting Safety Life Cycle and Automotive Safety Integrity Levels (ASIL) that classify the level of safety-related risks and their probable impact on the system. According to the standard, a system component on a high integrity level (ASIL C or D) is recommended to be evaluated using rigorous testing techniques and/or formal methods. Examples of recommended testing techniques are control-flow analysis, data-flow analysis, specification-based testing, and fault detection through fault seeding. Our approach utilizes control-flow analysis, data-flow analysis, and specification-based testing.
Though formal methods are recommended, the standard does not mention specific techniques. Our approach adopts model checking since it can be applied to any level of software artifacts and is fully automated.
Trampoline
Trampoline [24] is an open source, real-time operating system compliant with OSEK/VDX version 2.2.3. It is developed in ANSI C and can be ported to various hardware platforms such as Arm, POSIX, PPC, AVR, HCS12, C166, etc. Since it also supports POSIX, it can be test-run on a UNIX/Linux environment before being ported to an actual operational environment. As its target platform varies, its platform-dependent part is clearly structured in a separate module that combines with the kernel module at compile time. Access to the hardware-specific part is abstracted using extern variables and macros so that the main control logic does not need to be aware of the specific hardware feature.
Development of an automotive software using Trampoline requires four components: (1) application source code, (2) kernel configuration generated from the configuration description written in OIL (OSEK Implementation Language) using the Goil compiler, (3) generic OS kernel code compliant with the OSEK/VDX standard, and (4) platform-dependent kernel code. The generic OS kernel code implements services for task management, resource management, interrupt handling, and event/counter/alarm management, providing corresponding APIs.
The source code consists of 174 functions comprising a total of 4,530 lines of code.
Model checking using CBMC
Formal verification methods based on model checking [4] are effective techniques for identifying subtle issues in software safety which is particularly important for embedded systems. Current technological advances in model checking enable engineers to directly apply the technique to program source code, removing the manual model construction process. CBMC [25] is one of these model checking tools, which is capable of verifying almost full ANSI C. It can be used to verify buffer overflows, pointer safety, exceptions and user-specified assertions. Furthermore, it can check ANSI C and C++ for consistency with other languages, such as Verilog. The main advantage is that it is completely automated and generates counterexample traces when a property in question is refuted.
As with any other model checking tool, CBMC also suffers from the problem of scalability. When applied to the Trampoline kernel as a whole with an arbitrary sequence of API calls, for example, it ran out of memory for checking one assertion on a PC with 3GB of memory.
Overall approach
Comprehensive verification, as required by functional safety analysis, is too costly to be applied in practice. Reducing the cost while maintaining comprehensiveness is a challenging, but crucial task. Our approach attempts to achieve this goal by applying the following three strategies:
1. Property-based code slicing: The operating system kernel is abstracted by extracting only the code relevant for a given property. 2. Constraint-based environment generation: We formalized the constraints specified in the OSEK/VDX standard using push-down automata and generated an environment of the operating system kernel based on the constraint automata. 3. Collaborative verification using model checking and testing: Both model checking and testing are used complementarily for the verification of the abstract kernel code under the generated environment model.
As illustrated in Figure 1 , our collaborative verification approach requires three types of inputs: system requirements and constraints from the standard, the source code of the operating system kernel, and the safety properties to be verified over the kernel. First, a dependency analysis is performed to identify the functions on which the variables associated with the safety properties are dependent. The minimum amount of code required to compile these functions is extracted. This process is automated through inter-process code slicing, which reduces the size of the code to be verified but retains the behavior of the system that has a direct/indirect impact on the safety properties. Second, requirements and constraints from the standard are used to analyze the interaction environment of the operating system and to construct constraint automata formally describing environmental constraints. By formally specifying legal and illegal behaviors of user tasks using constraint automata, we can classify the task behaviors and select task sequences that represent a class of task behaviors. These selected task sequences are used for guided testing and model checking.
To accelerate the efficiency and effectiveness of safety checking, our approach uses both model checking and testing to complementarily utilize their different capabilities when only limited resources are available. The same code extracted through property-based code slicing and the same environment model constructed from constraint automata are used for both model checking and guided testing. The guided testing includes system-level testing, where the test sequence is constructed w. r. t. the API calls between user tasks and the operating system kernel, and module-level testing, where the test sequence is constructed as a sequence of calls to unit functions. It is an integrated approach since the same code and the same environment model can be used for model checking and testing, and it is also a collaborative approach since lightweight verification is performed in module-level guided testing in an over-approximated environment, and then the result is confirmed or refuted by more heavy weight verifications using system-level testing and model checking.
Property-based code slicing
Comprehensive verification of the entire program code can be too costly and impractical as the complexity of the software system increases. It may also happen that not the entire code is necessary to check safety properties since they may be localized in a certain region of the code. With this observation in mind, our approach slices code w. r. t. the safety properties to be checked. Our slicing technique is based on existing static slicing [17, 18] techniques, but is extended to address issues with global variables and pointers. The result of slicing is used not only to reduce the program size to be verified, but also to identify a set of function signatures, either at the local level or at the system level, that are relevant for a given property to be verified.
The following two subsections summarize the basic terminologies and definitions required to define code slicing. We use standard definitions from Weiser [18] and Hatcliff et al. [17] , but present them here again to help readers understand (1) how these concepts are used to perform slicing of programs with multiple functions, global variables, and pointers, and (2) how the result of slicing can be used to localize the set of functions relevant for a given property.
The subsequent three subsections will describe our own extensions and applications. This is a classical definition of a CFG. We note that the definition is valid not only for representing intra-procedural control flow, but also for inter-procedural control flows, where a function call is considered void test( ){ int i, sum, product, n; (1) read(n); (2) i = 1; (3) sum = 0; (4) product = 1; (5) while (i <= n) { (6) sum = sum + i; (7) product = product * i; (8) i = i+1; } (9) print(sum); (10) Definition 2. Given a CFG P cfg and a node n in P cfg , -def (n) is the set of variables defined at node n, and -ref (n) is the set of variables referenced at node n.
Definition 3.
A slicing criterion C =< k, V > is a pair of a node k and a subset of program variables V .
Static slicing of a program for a given slicing criterion is iteratively performed using def and ref for each node, starting with the computation of the initially relevant variables.
Definition 4.
(Initially relevant variables) Given a slicing criterion C =< k, V >, the initially relevant variable on a node n, R 0 C (n) is the set of all variables v such that either: 1. n = k and v ∈ V , or 2. n is an immediate predecessor of a node m such that either:
Intuitively, a variable v is relevant for C if (1) v belongs to V at node k, or if (2a) v is used to define a variable in node n that is relevant for V in an immediate successor of the node n, or if (2b) v is relevant for V in an immediate successor node m of n and is not defined in the node n. , where each node is labeled with the line number. Assuming that we want to slice the program w. r. t. C =< 10, {product} >, the second row of Table 1 shows the initially relevant variables for each node; for example, R 0 C (10) = {product} since node 10 is in the slicing criterion and product is the only variable in the criterion. R 0 C (9) is the same since product is not defined in node 9 but is relevant in node 10.
2
The initial slice set is a set of nodes that defines relevant variables in a successor node and the initial branch set is a set of nodes on which a node in the initial slice set is control-dependent. Table 1 : Iterative computation of relevant sets for C =< 10, {product} > Definition 5. (Initial slice set and branch set)
is the initial branch set, where cd (n) is the set of nodes on which n is controldependent.
In the above example, the initial slice set S
However, we can see that the initial slice set is not sufficient to include all statements that are relevant for defining the variable product since it does not take branch conditions into account. The initial branch set B 0 C = {5} since node 7 in the initial slice set is control dependent on node 5.
The relevant set, the slice set, and the branch set are iteratively computed from this initial slice set and initial branch set as follows: Table 1 shows the relevant variables for each node after taking the initial branch set into account. Since B 0 C = {5} in this example, a new slicing criterion < 5, {i, n} > is added to the initial slicing criterion. The third row of Table 1 shows the complete list of R are monotonically increasing and the number of iterations is bounded by the number of variables in the program and the number of nodes in the control flow graph for the program. Therefore, the iteration eventually finishes at the fixed points R C (n) and S C which is the final slice set. Our example finishes slicing after the second iteration since the fixed point is reached afterward. The residual program after slicing, including the node for the slicing criterion, is highlighted in gray in Figure 2 (b).
Inter-procedural slicing
The previous section summarized the basic concepts for program slicing for a single unit function, which can be extended for inter-procedural slicing. Inter-procedural slicing is necessary when the program to be sliced calls or is called by other functions. For example, if line 7 of Figure 2 (a) is replaced by a function call product = compute prod(product, i), then slicing needs to determine the relevant part of the compute prod function to compute the value of production. This is called DownCall slicing. On the other hand, if a relevant variable of a node is not a local variable (e.g., n in node 5 in Figure 3 ), but is passed as a parameter to the function, then slicing also considers the caller functions that determine the actual value of the parameter. This is called UpCall slicing.
Definition 7.
(DownCall slicing criterion) Suppose a program P is to be sliced using a criterion C. For each function call from P to Q at node i in P , a new slicing criterion is defined as
QRET e } >, where n Q e is an exit node in Q, Succ(i) is the set of all the nearest successors of i in the CFG of P (or i, if it is in the slice), SCOPE Q is the set of variables accessible from the scope of Q, and n QRET e is an output (return) variable referenced in n This DownCall slicing criterion is basically the same as the one introduced earlier [18] , but is elaborated further for the cases when the function is used to define a relevant variable. The set of variables in the slicing criteria includes not only the relevant variables identified in the caller function P at the call statement, but also variables in return statements at the last nodes of Q, since the return value can determine the value of a relevant variable of the call statement. Since each function may have multiple exit nodes, DownCall slicing may add more than one new slicing criterion. Figure 3 is a variation of the test program in Figure 2 , where line 7 is replaced with a function call and the value of n is passed as a parameter from call test. The right side of Figure 3 shows its extended CFG, where the function calls are represented by dashed edges. In this case, a slicing criterion C Down(7) < 15, {k, d, c} > is added after computing R C (n) = R 2 C (n), where 7 is the node that calls the function compute prod , 15 is the exit node of the function, {k, d} is the set of variables that are in R C (7) = {prod , i, n} within the scope of the function compute prod , and {c} is the variable returned at node 15. Once a new slicing criterion is added, computation for the relevant variables, the branch set, and the slice set is repeated using the new set of slicing criteria. Definition 8. (UpCall slicing criterion) Suppose a program P that is to be sliced using a criterion C, is called by another program Q, and R C (n f ) = ∅, where n f is the first node in the CFG of P, then a new slicing criterion is defined as
where i is the node number that calls P in Q and [A/F ] means the replacement of formal parameters with actual parameters.
In Figure 3 , test is sliced first together with compute prod. Since R C (2) = {n} = ∅ in this case (meaning that the value of n is not defined within the function), we find functions that call test and add a new slicing criterion C U p =< 02, {m} >. Slicing continues with the extended criteria.
Dealing with global variables and pointers
Since embedded software such as operating systems make heavy use of global variables, our interprocedural slicing must take global variables into account. The use of pointers also requires extra attention since data dependency might not be identified from control dependency in both cases. To handle this issue, our slicing technique defines a new slicing criterion, named Global slicing criterion, for cases where the set of relevant variables R C (n) contains global variables. Definition 9. (Global slicing criterion) Suppose R C (n) ∩ G = ∅, where G is the set of global variables. The global slicing criterion is defined as C g (v, f v ) =< m, {v} > for each variable v ∈ R C (n) ∩ G, where f v is a function that defines v and m is the last node that defines v in f v .
Adding a global slicing criterion requires identifying functions that define global variables. This can be done by preprocessing functions before starting the slicing. For example, if the variable n in node 5 in Figure 3 is a global variable, instead of being a parameter, we identify a list of functions that define the variable n. If f is such a function, then C g (n, f ) =< m, {n} > is a global slicing criterion, where m is the last node in f that defines n .
Pointer variables can be treated in the same manner as global variables after pointer analysis w. r. t. the relationship PV → A × RV , where PV is the set of pointer variables, A is the set of address variables, and RV is the set of finally referenced variables. For example, if a program contains 1: int * x;
... m: x = &y; ... n : z = *x; ... then a tuple < x, (&y, y) > is stored and used to determine the final variable that is referenced by the pointer variable. In the slicing process, R 0 C (m) includes &y while R 0 C (n) includes y. Adding a global slicing criterion is next if y is a global variable. Here, we assume that the use of pointers follows the coding standard for critical systems, such as MISRA-C [29] . Therefore, we assume that pointer variables refer to fixed memory locations and do not consider dynamic dereferencing of pointer variables.
Overall process for property-based slicing
Property-based slicing sets the initial slicing criteria as {< n i , V i >} for a given set of properties A i , where V i is the set of variables referenced by A i and n i is the node number where A i is specified. The initial set of slice target functions {P i } includes all the functions to which each n i belongs. Starting from these initial slicing criteria and initial slice target functions, property-based slicing is iteratively performed as follows:
1. An extended CFG is constructed for functions in the initial set of slice target functions. 2. Slicing, including DownCall slicing, is performed on the extended CFG w. r. t. the initial slicing criteria.
Add new slicing criteria and their corresponding slice target functions (by constructing their CFGs) if the sets of relevant variables include global variables. 3. If the R C (0) of P i is not empty, perform UpCall slicing for P i . Here, only the set of relevant variables at the first statement of P i in the scope of the caller function is of interest. Let's call this V R . 4. Continue slicing for the caller function using C =< N R , V R >, where N R is the node to call P i in the caller function. Add new slicing criteria and their corresponding slice target functions if the sets of relevant variables include global variables. 5. Repeat from step 1 with extended slicing criteria and the extended set of slice target functions until no further slice set element is added and no further new slice target criterion is added.
The process repeats unit slicing, DownCall slicing, Global slicing, UpCall slicing, and Global slicing, in this order until no further slice set elements are added and no further slice target functions are identified. We note that the process finally finishes and reaches a fixed point since there can be only a finite number of statements and a finite number of functions. It is a sound approach since the resulting slice set includes all statements that define the relevant variables of the initial slice set.
Function slicing
Once the slicing reaches a fixed point, we combine the slice set with the final slice target functions, which constitutes the module-level functions for the given set of properties. This set of module-level functions, M Ai , is the set of sliced functions w. r. t. the set of properties {A i }. This constitutes the target of localized testing. It is also used to automatically generate the verification environment for module-level verification using model checking and testing. Once this M p is computed, we can identify the system-level functions that will eventually call a modulelevel function through backward reachability analysis on a function call graph, under the assumptions that (1) system level functions are not called by system level functions, and (2) the function call graph is not cyclic. Figure 4 shows the conceptual diagram for the computation of module-level functions, module-level abstract kernel, system-level functions, and system-level abstract kernel.
The purpose of computing module-level and system-level functions is two-fold: these functions are used to (1) construct a compilable residual program as the result of slicing, and more importantly, (2) to construct environment models for the module-level abstract kernel and the system-level abstract kernel, respectively.
A module-level environment model is constructed using only these module-level function signatures, with its corresponding abstract kernel encompassing all the identified module-level functions w. r. t. the given property. We then identify system-level functions for each of the module-level functions. A systemlevel environment model consists of calls to those system-level functions. Its corresponding abstract kernel encompasses all the identified system-level functions, intermediate functions, and their dependent code in the call graph.
Environment model and test sequence generation
A straightforward way to include all possible task interactions with the operating system is to model a task as an arbitrary call sequence to system functions. However, this includes too many spurious and/or impossible behaviors, thus increasing the cost for verification as well as the cost for counterexample analysis; if n system calls are provided by the operating system, there can be (m-permutations of n) n P m = n * (n − 1) * . . . * (n − m + 1) ways to call m system calls out of n when duplication is not allowed. n m is the number of possible call sequences if the same call can be used multiple times. Considering that the length of the system call sequence m is not pre-defined, it is impractical to perform comprehensive verification with respect to the entire function call space. In fact, our prior experiments [1] show that model checking the Trampoline kernel using CBMC under the entire function call space was too costly to get a meaningful verification result.
Instead, our approach partitions the call space into a legal call space and an illegal call space using constraint automata, and systematically selects representative call sequences that cover all transitions in the constraint automata [30] . Constraints C1 Ending a task without a call to TerminateTask or ChainTask is strictly forbidden and causes undefined behavior. C2 TerminateTask, ChainTask, Schedule, WaitEvent shall not be called while a resource is occupied. C3 A task calling WaitEvent shall go to the waiting state and shall not be activated again before SetEvent is called by other tasks. C4 OSEK strictly forbids nested access to the same resource. C5 A task shall not terminate without releasing resources. Table 2 : A list of constraints from OSEK/VDX Definition 13. Let Σ be a subset of system functions in a given operating system. Then, the function call space with respect to Σ, F (Σ) = {< s i >| s i ∈ Σ}, is a set of arbitrary call sequences in Σ.
Σ can be the entire set of system functions, the set of system-level functions or the set of module-level functions for a given property.
Environment construction using constraint automata
The OSEK/VDX standard explicitly/implicitly specifies constraints among possible system calls from a set of application tasks. For example, Table 2 is a list of some constraints identified from the OSEK/VDX standard. We note that these constraints can be categorized into four types which can be formally specified in context-free grammar.
T 1 . A system call f 1 shall be followed by f 2 (though not necessarily directly).
T 2 . The number of calls to f is limited by n. For example, the constraint C 2 can be considered a T 3 type, as TerminateTask, ChainTask, Schedule, and WaitEvent are not allowed to be called in between GetResource and ReleaseResource. The constraint C 5 is a T 1 type since it says that GetResource shall be followed by ReleaseResource for normal termination. The corresponding context-free grammar for a language that satisfies both T 1 and T 3 is as follows:
For the case of C 2 and C 5 , we can consider a = GetResource, b = ReleaseResource, and c ∈ {TerminateTask , ChainTask , Schedule, WaitEvent}. According to the grammar, ReleaseResource must be called if GetResource is called (C 5 ) and no calls to TerminateTask, ChainTask, Schedule, and WaitEvent are allowed in between the calls GetResource and ReleaseResource (C 2 ). We call such a set of prohibited system calls an exclusive set.
The corresponding pushdown automaton for this grammar is shown in Figure 5 (a) where s 0 is the initial state and the final state. It ignores inputs other than a or b, moves to the state s 1 pushing 0 to the stack if a is the input, and moves to the error state s 3 if b is the input. In s 1 , inputs other than a, b, c are ignored, but it moves to s 2 pushing 1 to the stack if a is the input and the stack top is 0, moves back to s 0 removing the stack top if the input is b and the stack top is 0, and moves to s 3 if c is the input. In s 2 , it pushes 1 to the stack if the input is a, removes the top from the stack if the input is b and the stack top is 1, moves back to s 0 if the input is b and the stack top is 0, and moves to s 3 if the input is c. We note that such c can be extended to a set C, an exclusive set, meaning that any input that belongs to C causes transitions from s 1 , s 2 to s 3 . As illustrated in Figure 5 (b), this automaton can be used to classify call sequences depending on whether the sequence ends in an accepting state or not. For example, a call sequence ayabb is a legal call sequence while ayyabc is an illegal call sequence. shows an example of a system-level environment model consisting of three parallel constraint automata, where each automaton is in the category of T 1 ∧T 3 and x, y, and c in the grammar are differentiated using the prefixes T , R, and E. The automaton for Task looks slightly different because its exclusive set is empty.
This model is used as a verification environment for model checking OSEK/VDX-based operating systems as well as a test sequence generation engine for guided system-level testing. Since the use of the environment model for testing purposes requires one more step for automated test sequence generation, the following sections will provide more details on the techniques.
Test sequence generation for guided system-level testing
Though an infinite number of test sequences can be generated from the environment model, our approach limits the number by defining a test policy; the current test policy aims at (1) generating at least one test sequence for each path from the initial state to the final state (legal behavior), (2) generating at least one test sequence for each path from the initial state to the error state, without considering loops (illegal behavior), and (3) using each system call as a test input at least once in the generated set of test sequences. 
Definition 16. (Projection and stuttering equivalence) According to Definition 16, a test path can be projected onto a specific constraint automaton, resulting in a sequence of states of the specific automaton that may contain repetitions, such as π = a 0 a 0 a 1 a 2 a 2 , . . . , a n . The simple trace of the projection is obtained by removing such repetitions, reducing π to a 0 a 1 a 2 , . . . , a n . Stuttering equivalence of two paths w. r. t. an automaton A i means that they show the same sequences of states if they are projected onto the automaton A i and duplications are removed afterward. For notational convenience, stuttering equivalence is denoted as p q.
A projection of a test path
We define test sequence generation strategies using these definitions:
Definition 17. (Test sequence generation strategy) A set of test sequences T generated from a given environment model must satisfy the following conditions: 
Path coverage for legal (illegal) paths means ensuring that every finite path that ends with the final state (a state other than the final state) is to be tested at least once, without considering repetition. Alphabet coverage ensures that each API call is to be tested at least once in the generated test sequences. A set of test sequences satisfying these conditions is a subset of the arbitrary test sequences of system calls, where both legal call sequences and illegal call sequences are comprehensively represented by selected test sequences. 
Mapping system-level test sequences to module-level sequences
Module-level testing requires module-level call sequences as its test environment instead of system call sequences. We can identify system-level environmental constraints from the OSEK/VDX standard, but module-level environmental constraints are not explicit and are internally embedded in the relationship between system-level functions and module-level functions. Nevertheless, module-level functions cannot be executed unless they are directly/indirectly called by a system-level function, and, the constraints imposed on system-level functions must thus be implicitly obeyed by the module-level functions.
We note that the implicit constraints can be identified from the call relationship between system-level functions and module-level functions, which we already identified during the computation of the relevant functions: Given a system-level function, a set of module-level functions that are directly/indirectly called by the function is computed during the forward reachability analysis. Table 3 shows a list of such mappings between some system-level and module-level functions. For example, the external constraint "WaitEvent can be called after SetEvent is called" can be re-interpreted as "tpl get proc can be called after tpl put new proc and tpl schedule from running are called", according to the mapping table.
Definition 18. Given a set of system-level functions Σ and a set of module-level functions Σ , let M : Σ → SUBSEQ(Σ ) be a function that maps each system-level function name to a finite sequence of names of module-level functions. Then, a module-level test sequence t m is defined for each system-level test sequence
Consequently, the set of module-level sequences T m is defined as {t m | t ∈ T }, where T is the set of system-level test sequences.
Implementation
The proposed approach was implemented in a prototype tool consisting of three sub-modules: (1) a module for property-based code slicing as described in Section 4, (2) a module for constraint-based environment generation as described in Section 5, and (3) a module for test driver generation that generates drivers connecting the test sequences and the abstract kernel.
The tool set is implemented in Java, C++, and partially in C for the environment generation for CBMC. Figure 7 and Figure 8 show overviews of the relationships and processes among the modules.
A module for property-based code slicing
The left side of Figure 7 shows the structure of the module for property-based code slicing. The inter procedural code slicing includes submodules for CFG construction, pointer analysis, unit slicing, DownCall slicing, UpCall slicing, and Global slicing. The CFG construction is implemented with the aid of the C parser of Eclipse CDT [31] . Module-level function extraction extracts a list of module-level functions from the result of slicing. These are used to generate module-level test sequences and module-level abstract kernels. Systemlevel function extraction extracts a list of system-level functions through backward-reachability analysis of function call graphs from the list of module-level functions. These are used to generate system-level test sequences and system-level abstract kernels, as defined in Definition 12. The abstract kernels are compilable residual programs, which are in ANSI-C code.
A module for constraint-based environment construction and test generation
The right side of Figure 7 shows how test sequences are generated using the constraint-based environment model. As explained in Section 5, multiple constraints identified from the OSEK/VDX standard are provided as input to create constraint automata from which system-level test sequences are generated following the test strategies defined in Definition 17. The generated system-level test sequences are the basis for modulelevel test sequence generation, as each of them is mapped to a module-level test sequence.
The generated test sequences need to be valid test sequences w. r. t. the configuration and the internal state of the operating system under test. However, when test sequences are generated based on constraint automata only, the sequences may not be valid sequences when other variables -system configuration, states of tasks and the internal state of the operating system -are taken into account. For example, a sequence WaitEvent-WaitEvent-SetEvent-SetEvent is a legal test sequence according to the constraint automata in Figure 6 , but may not be valid for a system with two tasks, since calling WaitEvent twice in a row makes both tasks transit to waiting state, leaving no runnable task to call SetEvent afterward.
To check the validity of the test sequence, we developed an OSEK/VDX simulator. It simulates the behavior of an operating system with specific system configuration for an API call sequence, to validate the test sequences w. r. t. a given system configuration. Figure 8 shows the overall process of test sequence generation using the environment model and the OSEK/VDX simulator. The role of the OSEK/VDX simulator is to simulate the functional behavior of Figure 9 : Test driver generation OSEK/VDX to check the validity of each API call during test sequence generation. It imitates major functional requirements of OSEK/VDX such as priority-based ready queue, task scheduling policy, resource management, and event management. Each time the generator chooses an API call from the environment model according to the test sequence generation strategy, the simulator intervenes to check the validity of the chosen API call depending on the current context. The information the simulator traces to check the validity includes static configuration of tasks, resources and events, and dynamic states of tasks. If the chosen API call is valid and thus executable, the simulator updates its internal states of tasks, resources, and events, as if the operating system had actually executed the API. Otherwise, the generator chooses another API call according to the strategy and repeats the process until all the test policies have been executed.
A module for test driver generation
The system-level and module-level test sequences run on the system-level and module-level abstract kernel, respectively. Execution of test sequences on abstract kernels, however, requires another step called test driver generation; generated test drivers call test sequences with appropriate parameters. Figure 9 shows how these test drivers are generated. The three modules for the driver, the abstract kernel and the call sequences, as shown in Figure 9 , are used to apply three different verification approaches in collaboration: system-level guided testing, model checking using CBMC, and module-level guided testing.
Experiments
The goal of our approach is to find safety faults in software code more efficiently and effectively. To show that our goal can be achieved in practice, we conducted a series of experiments and evaluated their results using the following measures:
1. Failure-detection capability and efficiency, in terms of the number of safety-related failures identified w. r. t. the resource consumed. 2. Comprehensiveness of the verification in terms of code coverage. 3. The benefits of collaborative verification using three different verification techniques in terms of how they complement each other.
The experiment was performed on the Trampoline operating system using the three assertions included in the code:
assert(tpl h prio = −1)
(1)
assert(tpl kern → state == RUNNING) tpl h prio is the value of the highest-priority task in the ready queue in the Trampoline kernel. tpl h prio = −1 is supposed to be true whenever rescheduling is necessary. tpl kern stores the key information of the currently running task. tpl kern = NULL and tpl kern → state == RUNNING checks whether the state of the running task is RUNNING when the scheduler is called.
We performed verification of these three assertions using the model checker CBMC, system-level testing, and module-level testing. For the verification using CBMC, elapsed time and memory consumption were measured to show the efficiency of the verification. For system-level and module-level testing, branch coverage was measured using the code coverage measurement tool Squish Coco [32] . All experiments were performed on Linux Fedora 19 OS, with an Intel Xeon 3.4GHz e3-1270 processor and 32GB of 1333MHz DDR3 RAM. The system configuration for the Trampoline OS was defined using two tasks, two resources, and one event, for this experiment. Table 4 shows the complexity of each abstract kernel, in terms of the number of lines of code, the number of module-level functions, and the total number of extracted functions after applying propertybased function slicing. We note that the original size of the code for the entire Trampoline kernel is about 4,500 lines. Module 1 is the system-level abstract kernel for assertion 1 and Module 2 is the system-level abstract kernel for assertion 2 and 3. Module 3 is a module-level abstract kernel extracted for assertion 1 and Module 4 is a module-level abstract kernel used for assertions 2 and 3. Table 5 shows the branch coverage of the module-level functions involved in module-level testing and system-level testing as the number of test sequences increased. Though three different assertions were used, slicing happened to produce the same abstract kernel for the system-level. Therefore, only one system-level abstract kernel was used in the experiment. In system-level testing, branch coverage was measured for module-level functions in Module 3 and Module 4, showing that average branch coverage increases as the number of test sequences increases.
Verification cost and code coverage
In module-level testing, the branch coverage of each module-level function was measured for two different models, Module 3 and Module 4. The branch coverage reached 89% on average after running 250 test sequences. It does not reach 100% even after running 400 test sequences, because some branches can be covered only under a specific system configuration. In most cases, module-level testing shows higher branch coverage than system-level testing, but exceptions exist; For example, the coverage for tpl terminate task service was 75% using system-level testing while it was 50% using module-level testing. This is because some testable branches may have been sliced out in the module-level abstract kernel because they are irrelevant to the property, while the system-level abstract kernel includes all the relevant functions in the original form. In the case of tpl terminate task service, for example, the system-level testing tested 3 branches out of 4, while module-level testing tested 1 branch out of 2 because the two branches were sliced out in module-level.
On average, coverage increased with smaller number of test sequences compared to the result of our previous work [1], because we improved the approach through guided test sequence generation using a constraint-based environment model, instead of using random test sequence generation. The time and memory consumed for testing 400 test sequences were negligible -within a second and less than 1 MB of Table 6 : Time and memory space consumed for verification using CBMC memory. We note that our approach is effective for code coverage, even though our testing strategy does not aim for a high code coverage. The same test sequences used for module-level testing were used as the environment in model checking. Model checking using CBMC was performed for each test sequence and the average cost in terms of time and memory consumption was measured. As shown in Table 6 , they took about 5 seconds on average for both modules, and consumed an average of 372 MB and 386 MB of memory, respectively. Compared to the result of our previous work [1], performance improved greatly because we no longer used the entire input space as the environment model. In this experiment, the unwind option was set to 100 and unwinding assertion errors did not occur, which means that the unwind option was large enough. In contrast, we could perform model checking only up to unwinding option 15 in our previous work because it consumed too much memory and time to finish the verification.
Identified failures
We found four new failure cases in the Trampoline operating system during the verification process. Two of them occurred when the SetEvent API function was called from a basic task, which is an illegal behavior. The third failure occurred when an API function that requires rescheduling of tasks was called after ReleaseResource had been called, to release an unoccupied resource. The last one occurred when ActivateTask was called over the maximum size of the variable that stores the number of activation count. The first three failures were identified by all three verification techniques, but the last failure could only be found by module-level testing in our experimental setting. This section includes a detailed analysis of two of these four identified failure cases. Figure 10 : A code fragment related to the array bound error and null pointer exception
We found two critical errors, an array bound error and a null pointer exception, from a simple test scenario in which a basic task calls SetEvent using an event that does not belong to the task:
... // no system call ... } } Figure 10 depicts the code segment that shows the source of the safety fault. According to the OSEK/VDX standard, an event is owned by a task, and only the task that owns the event can call WaitEvent and receive SetEvent. This is implemented in the Trampoline OS as an array of events tpl task events table in Figure 10 , and the array is accessed by the task identifier task id, which means that the size of the event table needs to be at least the same as the number of tasks. However, even though two tasks are defined in the system configurations, we note that the event table does not reflect this fact (the size of tpl task events table is only 1 as shown in line 2 of Figure 10 ). Therefore, if tpl set event is called with task id = 1 as its parameter, an array bound error occurs, because it tries to access tpl task events table[1] in line 6. If a segmentation fault does not occur in line 6, a NULL value will be assigned to the variable events in line 6. The branch condition is satisfiable in line 7 and a null pointer exception occurs in line 8, consequently.
Overflow errors
Module-level testing caught an overflow error in the Trampoline kernel as illustrated in Figure 11 . This error occurred because the size of the variables saving the task activation count is limited to 8 bits; the second line of Figure 11 shows that Task2 has the activation count 255, but adding another activation causes an overflow and changes its value to 0. So Trampoline changed the value of tpl h prio to -1, meaning that the process table has no activated task available. The variable size is implementation-specific and is not constrained to 8 bits neither in the OIL specification nor in the OSEK/VDX specification. This problem could be addressed by constraining the size to 8 bits in the OIL specification.
Evaluation
All three verification techniques were able to identify the failures introduced in Figure 10 , but the points of discoveries were different. CBMC was able to find the array bound error in line 6, but module-level and system-level guided testing found the null pointer exception in line 8, missing the array bound error in line 6. It is worth noting that if access to the null pointer was guarded in line 8, e.g., (events = NULL), the issue in line 6 would not be discovered with testing, and would remain as a potential safety fault.
On the other hand, the overflow error could be found only by module-level testing; the other two techniques were unable to find the same error. This is because such an error requires a lengthy test sequence, at least long enough to invoke the same function more than 255 times, which is possible in module-level testing by combining all 400 test sequences. A model checker might be able to find this type of potential faults if we could use the 400 test sequences in one environment model, but we were not able to finish the verification using CBMC due to a lack of memory and time. Such a lengthy sequence was not possible in system-level testing, due to two limitations: (1) The test policy requires covering all possible paths in the constraint automata without considering loops, and thus the generated test sequences are rather short, and (2) a test sequence must be a valid sequence of system calls w. r. t. the system's internal state, and thus just combining generated test sequences to make a lengthy sequence does not generate a valid system level sequence. However, these limitations could be lifted by changing the testing policy.
All errors except for the overflow error are newly identified in this work. Unlike in our previous works [10, 1] where we focused mainly on the legal interaction environment without systematic consideration of system constraints, this work constructed environment based on the system constraints, which contributed to identifying more safety faults. For example, the two test sequences that are generated from illegal environments -"SetEvent is called from basic task" and "ReleaseResource is called to release an unoccupied resource" -revealed two safety faults. This result shows that the use of a constraint-based environment increases the failure-detection capability at a lower cost.
For another benefit of this approach, reproduction of errors identified from module-level testing became possible on the system level, through the mapping of module-level functions to system-level functions. Once we identify a module-level test sequence that causes a failure, we can refer to the constraint-based environment model and the mapping relation between system and module level functions, to get a corresponding system-level call sequence that leads to a failure on the system level. This was not possible in our previous work, which used random test sequence generation.
Related work
Program slicing [18] has been a popular technique for reducing verification complexity for both model checking and testing. Binkley [33] and Gupta et al. [34] used slicing algorithms to explicitly detect defuse associations that are affected by a program change for efficient regression testing. Chebaro et al. [35] performed program slicing for C programs with respect to the alarms generated from value analysis. He and Hsiao [36] integrated aggressive program slicing and a proof-based abstraction-refinement strategy for wireless cognitive radio systems. It is a representative example of using program slicing and bounded model checking for embedded software, but slicing is integrated into the model checking process, and is thus not suitable for application in testing.
Hatcliff et al. [17] provided a basis for our work in that it proves the safety of code slicing with respect to model checking linear temporal logic. Our work is an application of such code slicing specialized in the domain of automotive operating systems.
Environment modeling for efficient model checking has been an active research issue [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16] . A work published at AMAST 1993 [12] is one of the earliest works concerning environment assumptions in verification. It introduced the observer concept to represent assumptions about the environment. The approaches for assumption generation were developed further in other works [11, 37, 38, 15] . Tkachuk et al. [15] automatically generated the environment of Java programs from the specifications written by a user. Works done by Gupta et al. [37] and Nam et al. [38] are concerned with automatic partitioning, learning, or minimizing assumptions for compositional verification. None of them considers environment generation for both model checking and testing.
Several specification-based environment generation methods exist: Parizek and Plasil [39] used ADL to define protocols of Java components and constructs an environment for ADL specification. Dwyer and Pasareanu [40] described environmental assumptions in LTL and uses them to filter a universal environment, which is adopted in our approach to constrain the non-deterministic initial task model. Yatake and Aoki [16] constructed environment models from UML use cases analyzed from the OSEK/VDX standard in the form of UML state diagrams and class diagrams. The models are then used to automatically generate exhaustive test cases for the conformance testing of OSEK/VDX-compliant operating systems [41] . However, the environment model is analyzed with specific foci and does not cover the entire input space.
There have been more traditional approaches for verifying automotive software using formal methods [42, 43] , formally specifying OSEK/VDX requirements in CSP, and performing formal verification using model checking or theorem proving. Using such formal specification languages requires experts in formal methods, who are usually not available in practice. Our earlier work [10] reported a case study on model checking Trampoline OS using SPIN for safety properties specified in temporal logic. The study identified potential safety problems, but verification was performed on a PROMELA model translated from the kernel code. The approach is effective in identifying functional safety issues, but is not suitable for checking code safety, such as array bound errors and null pointer exceptions.
A sketch of our initial idea was published in [44] , which performed property-based function extraction using only def, use relations without performing code slicing. The resulting function extraction was neither sound nor complete.
Discussion
This paper presented methods and tools for property-based function slicing and environment generation to improve the efficiency of verification using model checking and testing. Based on classic slicing theory, our approach not only slices the target code, but also uses the result of slicing for the construction of an environment model. Our approach for environment generation is unique in that constraints are formally specified using constraint automata from which comprehensive test sequence generation can be automated. The benefit of property-based environment generation is two-fold: (1) It reduces verification cost by reducing the target code and limiting its environment to the task interaction scenario relevant for the verification property, and (2) it simplifies the analysis process and localizes the verification activity by focusing on the points of interest.
The effect of using the suggested approach was demonstrated through a series of experiments using the Trampoline operating system as a case example. We were able to identify several safety faults in the system using a moderate number of resources. Compared to our earlier case studies performed on the same operating system [10, 1] , the suggested approach shows clear benefits:
as compilers and run-time environment. Module-level testing is capable of performing stress testing, which is not easy to do with model checking or system-level testing. System-level testing provides a systematic method for confirming problems identified from model checking or module-level testing.
The proposed approach was applied to the verification of the Trampoline operating system and identified four critical safety problems, which had neither been identified by the model checker SPIN nor by static code analysis tools. We do not claim that our approach is the only approach that could identify such problems; in fact, they could be identified by existing conformance testing if test sequences are carefully designed and tested in debugging mode. A key advantage of our work lies in its efficiency, resulting from its use of a systematic approach that is fully automated.
There are a couple of issues to be addressed to make our approach complete. First, although the current approach does not limit the type of safety properties in theory, the implementation considers only properties written in propositional logic. An extension aimed at verifying temporal logic properties will be interesting and challenging. Second, our approach does not limit itself to a specific implementation method. For example, our tool implements a simulator to check the validity of system-level test sequences w. r. t. a system's internal states, which is less efficient compared to the formal approach using NuSMV presented in SEFM 2013 [30] . We need to further investigate the relative benefits of using informal/formal simulators in practice. Furthermore, our approach currently does not handle interrupt service routines and alarms, mainly because the environment modeling and test sequence generation process does not take interrupts into account. Interrupt handling could be a major source of unexpected behavior of operating systems. It is important to support systematic verification of the interrupt service routines in order to identify subtle safety issues. Finally, OSEK OS has been adopted by the AUTOSAR consortium, which makes it a de facto standard of the automotive industry worldwide. We believe that our approach can be applied to AUTOSAR OS without a lot of changes since the basic requirements and constraints of OSEK OS are preserved in AUTOSAR OS with little change. This claim has to be proven through further case studies using AUTOSAR OS.
